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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are few constitutional questions that have so confounded the 
Courts considering equality rights challenges as the relationship between 
sections 15(2) and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
1
 
In a nutshell, the jurisprudence governing the role of section 15(2) since 
1985 can, with some notable exceptions, be characterized as a history of 
duelling perspectives and confusion. The Supreme Court‟s recent 
decision in R. v. Kapp
2
 holds out great promise that this confusion will be 
remedied. It also provides the most definitive restatement of the analytic 
framework under section 15(1) since the articulation of the test in Law v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).
3
 It is for these 
reasons that Kapp is arguably the most important decision on equality 
rights in the last 10 years. 
The decision in Kapp sees the Court explicitly reaching into the past 
to articulate its vision of substantive equality. This is made manifest in 
the Court‟s frequent reference to (and reliance upon) jurisprudence and 
academic commentaries that pre-date its decision in Law. An examination 
of the legislative and judicial history of section 15(2) pre-Law is, 
                                                                                                             
*  Michael H. Morris (General Counsel) and Joseph K. Cheng (Counsel) are lawyers in the 
Public Law Group of the Department of Justice Canada (Ontario Regional Office). While Mr. Morris 
was one of the counsel that represented the Attorney General of Canada (as Intervenor) in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Lovelace discussed here, and in Misquadis at both levels of the Federal 
Court, any and all opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and do not, in any 
way, represent the views of the Attorney General of Canada, any official of the Department of 
Justice Canada or the policy of the Government of Canada. The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
assistance of Stella Luk, Michael Beggs and Tracy Rotstein for their research assistance (present and 
past) on this paper. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. 
3  [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
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therefore, an important means through which to gain insight into the 
Court‟s current thinking about substantive equality. Towards that end, 
this paper will examine and situate Kapp within this history, and discuss 
the potential (as yet unfulfilled) promise that it holds of a return to a 
more straightforward substantive equality analysis when addressing 
challenges to ameliorative programs. While acknowledging Kapp‟s 
potential, this paper will also set out the many fundamental questions that 
are not yet answered by it. These questions include whether and how 
Kapp applies to under-inclusive challenges brought by disadvantaged 
claimants to ameliorative programs, and what role the contextual factors 
underlying the human dignity test set out in Law (and most particularly 
the correspondence analysis) may yet have. 
Kapp was a Charter challenge brought by a number of mainly non-
Aboriginal fishers against the federal government‟s granting of a 
communal fishing licence to members of three Aboriginal bands. This 
licence gave the bands in question the exclusive right to fish for salmon 
in the Fraser River for a period of 24 hours in August 1998. The 
appellants argued that the granting of the fishing licence to these bands 
discriminated against them on the basis of race, contrary to section 15(1). 
The Crown asserted that the licence was granted under a regulatory 
program which ameliorated the conditions of a disadvantaged group. 
The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the program was not 
discriminatory under section 15. In doing so, McLachlin C.J.C. and 
Abella J. contributed two important developments to the equality 
analysis. First, they provided a definitive restatement of the inquiry 
required under section 15(1), reformulating and refocusing the test from 
Law. Second, they breathed new life into section 15(2), hitherto a 
provision of the Charter that had been relegated to being an “interpretive 
aid” without its own independent force. In doing so, the Court articulated 
a new framework for assessing whether a particular government program 
is ameliorative such that it is not discriminatory under section 15(2). In 
both of these key respects, Kapp represents a jumping-off point for a new 
path in equality rights — arguably one that more clearly returns to the 
original substantive equality purpose lying behind the subsection. And it 
is the purpose of that subsection, and the early jurisprudence interpretation 
of it, that will be turned to next. 
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF  
SECTION 15(2) PRE-KAPP 
1.  The Legislative History and Objective of Section 15(2):  
Canada Reaffirms its Commitment to Substantive Equality 
It is often observed
4
 that section 15(2) of the Charter was a response 
to a concern that Canada‟s enshrining of the principle of equality in its 
Constitution could render governments subject to “reverse discrimination” 
claims analogous to what was happening in the U.S. at that time — as 
was illustrated in the 1978 case of Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke.
5
 The United States Constitution does not contain an equivalent 
clause to section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court adopted in Bakke — and continues to adopt6 — a formalistic view 
of equality, applying a test of “strict scrutiny” to all race-based 
affirmative action programs. Specifically, the American approach to 
affirmative action requires that governments demonstrate that such 
programs serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to 
that interest. 
The drafters of the Charter clearly signalled their firm rejection of 
this formal approach to equality in favour of a substantive approach. In 
contrast with the U.S. approach, this approach explicitly affirms the 
legitimacy of special positive government actions designed to ameliorate 
the situation of disadvantaged groups. 
                                                                                                             
4  See, e.g., Lovelace v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2313, 33 O.R. (3d) 735, at 751 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Lovelace (C.A.)”], citing M. (N.) v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Family and 
Child Services), [1986] B.C.J. No. 1712, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 488 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “M. (N.)”]. 
5  438 U.S. 265. Bakke challenged a special program at Davis Medical School at the 
University of California which reserved 16 out of every 100 places for “economically and/or 
educationally disadvantaged and minority applicants”. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 
program. Four Justices — Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist JJ. and Burger C.J. — found that the 
program violated the 1964 Civil Rights Act and struck down the program upon that basis. Four other 
Justices — Brennan, Blackmun, Marshal and White JJ. — upheld the program. They found that the 
1964 Civil Rights Act only prohibited racial distinctions that would violate the 14th Amendment. 
They further found that the important objective of remedying past societal discrimination was 
sufficient to justify the program under the 14th Amendment. Justice Powell agreed that the 1964 
Civil Rights Act only prohibited discrimination that violated the 14th Amendment; however, the 
program did not survive the 14th Amendment. 
6  For two post-Bakke examples of the American approach, see Adarand Constructors Inc. 
v. Pena, 63 U.S.L.W. 4523 at 5430, 5431 to 5433 (U.S. 1995). See also: City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, at 493 and 507 (1989). 
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The legislative history supports this broad objective.
7
 In particular, it 
is noteworthy that the original version of the proposed Constitutional Bill 
C-60 (given first reading in June, 1978) did not contain any provision 
protecting affirmative action.
8
 In response to concerns raised during 
testimony, the special joint committee recommended to Parliament that: 
special programs on behalf of disadvantaged groups or persons should 
be protected. Such programs are intended to prevent or reduce 
disadvantages suffered by groups on the basis of such factors as are 
specifically authorized by the Canadian Human Rights Act … The 
proposed Charter should not prevent special programs on behalf of 
disadvantaged groups.
9
 
As was pointed out by those advocating for protection of affirmative 
action programs, the principle of substantive, as opposed to formal 
equality, was already well established in the federal and provincial 
human rights codes prior to the Charter — and long before the 
controversial U.S. decision in Bakke.
10
 For example, section 16(1) of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act states: 
16(1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry 
out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disad-
vantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce 
disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those 
disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, 
facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group.
11
 
The willingness in Canada to embrace special measures for 
vulnerable minority groups also found expression in the Constitution Act, 
                                                                                                             
7  See discussion in Lovelace (C.A.), supra, note 4, at 752-53. 
8  Bill C-60, the Constitutional Amendment Bill, 30th Parl. (1st Reading: June 20, 1978). 
9  Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of 
Canada, Second Report to Parliament (October 10, 1978), Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, at 
20:4, cited in Anne Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary 
History (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1989), at 424. 
10  Kenneth Fogarty, Equality Rights and their Limitations in the Charter (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1987), at 114. 
11  Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 16(1); See also British Columbia 
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 25; Manitoba Human Rights Code, C.C.S.M. 1987, 
c. H175, s. 10; New Brunswick Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11, s. 13; Newfoundland 
and Labrador Human Rights Code, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. H-14, s. 19; Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, 
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 6(i); Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 14(1); Prince 
Edward Island Human Rights Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-12, s. 20; Quebec Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 86; Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1, s. 47; 
Yukon Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 116, s. 13. 
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1867. Specifically, section 93 provides for separate schools and section 
133 protects language rights. In addition, the wording of section 29 of the 
Charter makes it clear that the Charter is not intended to affect the 
special rights or privileges otherwise guaranteed under the Constitution 
in respect of separate schools.
12
 
Thus the legislative history of section 15(2) demonstrates the clear 
intent to silence any debate in Canada about the possibility of reverse 
discrimination lawsuits being initiated by individuals from socially 
privileged and/or advantaged sectors. As will be discussed below, that 
was a critical message to Courts in how they should interpret equality 
rights generally — and that message was heard. 
While clear in respect of the broad message of substantive equality 
enshrined in section 15(2), the legislative history of the subsection does 
not shed any real light on how that section was supposed to work in 
practice. It is silent about the relationship of section 15(1) to section 
15(2), namely, whether section 15(2) could be viewed as an exception to 
the guarantee of equality in section 15(1) or an affirmation of it. Was 
section 15(2) a defence to a section 15(1) equality breach claim, or 
simply an “interpretive” aid set out to enhance our understanding of 
section 15(1)? The legislative history surrounding section 15(2) also does 
not illuminate the practical and critically important question of how a 
Court should characterize an ameliorative program for purposes of 
section 15(2), nor what the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of 
challenges to programs with ameliorative objectives should be. 
This lack of clarity would be reflected in the confusing jurisprudence 
that clearly struggled with these practical questions in the first 15 years 
in the life of section 15 (and arguably to this day). 
2.  Jurisprudence Prior to Lovelace: An Elusive Search for the 
Appropriate Relationship between Subsections 15(2) and 15(1) 
Section 15(2) played a fundamentally important role in the early 
Supreme Court section 15 jurisprudence that fleshed out the Court‟s 
commitment to a substantive approach to equality. The substantive 
equality message and purpose of section 15(2), as envisaged by the 
                                                                                                             
12  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 
5, ss. 93, 133; Charter, supra, note 1, s. 29. See Walter Tarnopolsky, “The Equality Rights”, in 
Walter Tarnopolsky & Gérald-A. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 395, at 423-37 [hereinafter “Equality Rights”]. 
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framers, was not lost on the Court. While it would not be until 2000 that 
the Supreme Court would decisively address the interpretation of section 
15(2) or its relationship to section 15(1), the Court nevertheless made 
important passing references to the significance and operation of the 
section in its early equality jurisprudence. These references appear in 
cases such as Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, the Court‟s 
landmark (and now revived) decision on section 15. In obiter comments, 
McIntyre J. stated that the appropriate approach to justification was:
 
Where discrimination is found a breach of s. 15(1) has occurred and — 
where s. 15(2) is not applicable — any justification, any consideration 
of the reasonableness of the enactment; indeed, any consideration of 
factors which could justify the discrimination and support the 
constitutionality of the impugned enactment would take place under 
s. 1.
13
 
This position would seem to support the proposition that section 
15(2) could be used as a defence to a challenge under section 15(1) once 
a finding of discrimination had been made out. However, in Andrews, 
McIntyre J. also suggested that section 15(2) could be used as an 
interpretive device for section 15(1), remarking: 
… the fact that identical treatment may frequently produce serious 
inequality is recognized in s. 15(2), which states that the equality rights 
in s. 15(1) do “not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups …”14 
A similar statement about the substantive equality message set out in 
section 15(2) was made by La Forest J. in McKinney v. University of 
Guelph: 
The Charter itself by its authorization of affirmative action under s. 
15(2) recognized that legitimate measures for dealing with inequality 
might themselves create inequalities.
15
 
Clearly, the highest Court understood the broad message about 
substantive equality inherent in section 15(2). Yet not facing a case 
directly posing the issue of how to apply section 15(2) it — perhaps 
deliberately — provided no guidance on how the subsection actually 
                                                                                                             
13  [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 182 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. 
14  Id., at para. 34. 
15  [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at 318 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McKinney”]. 
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operated in the face of a challenge to an ameliorative affirmative action 
program. 
The lower courts did not assist in filling the early jurisprudential void 
surrounding section 15(2). In its totality, the section 15(2) jurisprudence 
leading up to the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s decision in Lovelace v. 
Ontario can be characterized as a tale of dissents, minority judgments 
and obiter comments.
16
 Very few cases conducted a thorough analysis of 
the section, and those that did rarely agreed on the proper approach to be 
taken — particularly on the critical issue of what had to be proven in 
respect of a program‟s objects to bring it within the parameters of section 
15(2). It was therefore not surprising that in Lovelace, neither the Ontario 
Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court took any particular notice of this 
jurisprudence.
17
 
(a)  Is the Object of the Program Within the Meaning of Section 15(2)? 
One of the main questions addressed in cases leading up to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal‟s decision in Lovelace is the degree of scrutiny 
applied to a government‟s defence that a particular program fell within 
the ambit of section 15(2). Is it enough for the government simply to say 
that a particular program is “ameliorative”? Does section 15(2) require a 
program have ameliorative objectives only, or does the government have 
to justify that it also has demonstrable ameliorative effects? Do the 
ameliorative objectives have to address the real cause of the 
disadvantage, or need it be merely beneficial generally? Does a program 
need to be exclusively ameliorative in its objective, or is it sufficient that 
its ameliorative purpose is one among others? 
The decisions prior to the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s decision in 
Lovelace vary widely in their approach to these critical issues. In some 
instances, the courts adopted a fairly interventionist approach to programs 
defined as ameliorative, and in others, a somewhat more deferential 
approach was adopted. 
At the most interventionist end of the spectrum, some courts required 
governments wishing to successfully invoke section 15(2) to establish 
                                                                                                             
16  Lovelace (C.A.), supra, note 4. The authors acknowledge their debt to Michael Beggs, 
Counsel, Department of Justice, and Tracy Rotstein, who carefully reviewed and characterized this 
case law in this succinct manner in a thorough and prescient piece of legal research done over 10 
years ago for one of the authors.  
17  Id.; Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Lovelace (S.C.C.)”]. 
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whether the discriminatory aspects are required if the ameliorative object 
of the legislation is to be attained.
18
 Some academics argued that 
governments should have to demonstrate that an ameliorative program 
can actually achieve its ameliorative object in order to come within the 
meaning of section 15(2). These academics argued that a purpose-based 
approach leaves the door open to governments to defend potentially 
discriminatory legislation by simply invoking an ameliorative purpose, 
or inserting clauses asserting an ameliorative purpose directly into 
legislation. This could result in an unacceptable loophole in the 
protection of equality rights.
19
 
Most academics — and Courts prior to Law — opted instead for a 
section 15(2) test that looked to the ameliorative purpose (or object) of 
the program or law, rather than its actual effects. This purpose-based 
approach was justified on the grounds of adhering most closely to the 
language of section 15(2) and avoiding an overly interventionist 
approach to judicial review.
20
 Within this broad perspective, however, 
there were distinct differences in approach, ranging from fairly 
deferential to more interventionist. On the more interventionist end, 
some case law required the government to demonstrate a “real nexus or a 
rational relationship” between the objective of the program and the cause 
of the disadvantage. This approach was adopted in the 1988 Manitoba 
Court of Appeal decision in Manitoba Rice Farmers Assn. v. Manitoba 
(Human Rights Commission).
21
 This case is notable, in particular, for 
being on the interventionist end of the spectrum of case law and 
(interestingly) being explicitly referred to with approval by the Court in 
Kapp.
22
 It was nevertheless criticized at the time by some academics for 
being unworkable, given the difficulties in identifying and redressing the 
root causes of disadvantage. As a practical matter, it is inherently 
                                                                                                             
18  Friesen v. Gregory, [1986] S.J. No. 662, 55 Sask. R. 245 (Sask. U.F.C.). 
19  See, e.g., M.D. Lepofsky & J. Bickenbach, “Equality Rights and the Physically 
Handicapped” in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 323-80. This article is canvassed in Kapp, supra, 
note 2, at para. 45. 
20  See Michael Pierce, “A Progressive Interpretation of Subsection 15(2) of the Charter” 
(1993) 57 Sask. L. Rev. 263, cited and relied upon in Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 44. 
21  [1987] M.J. No. 553, 50 Man. R. (2d) 92 (Man. Q.B.), varied on appeal (sub nom. Apsit 
v. Manitoba (Human Rights Commission)), [1988] M.J. No. 577, 55 Man. R. (2d) 263, at 270 (Man. 
C.A.) [hereinafter “Manitoba Rice Farmers”]. 
22  Supra, note 2, at paras. 46 and 48. See discussion below. 
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difficult to identify “causes” of disadvantage that may reflect or form 
part of a complex social phenomenon underlying disadvantage.
23
 
A somewhat less interventionist articulation of the “purpose-based” 
approach was adopted in a modified fashion by another group of cases 
which imposed a requirement that governments demonstrate a “rational 
connection” between the preferential treatment and the disadvantage.24 A 
third approach adopted a “gross unfairness” test and required governments 
to demonstrate that the program had as its object the amelioration of the 
condition of disadvantaged individuals or groups and that the effect of 
the distinction drawn by the program was not so unreasonable as to be 
grossly unfair to other individuals or groups.
25
 
(b)  Section 15(2) as an Exception or Defence to a Section 15(1) 
Challenge 
Up until the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s decision in Lovelace, the 
jurisprudence interpreting section 15(2) was united on one point: almost 
all of this jurisprudence accepted, with little question, that section 15(2) 
was an “exception” to a claim under section 15(1). In other words, the 
proper framework for assessing a government‟s claim of protection 
under section 15(2) was to find a prima facie infringement of section 
15(1), then determine whether the infringement was saved under section 
15(2).
26
 
The characterization of section 15(2) as an exception or defence to a 
section 15(1) challenge was not merely of academic significance but one 
that profoundly changed the analysis. First of all, as an exception or 
defence, section 15(2) could only be used to “save” a distinction already 
found to be prima facie discriminatory under section 15(1). Second, the 
                                                                                                             
23  See Beatrice Vizkelety, “Affirmative Action, Equality and the Courts: Comparing Action 
Travail des Femmes v. CN and Apsit and the Manitoba Rice Farmers Association v. The Manitoba 
Human Rights Commission” (1990) 4 C.J.W.L. 287, at 307 [hereinafter “Vizkelety”]. 
24  See, e.g., M. (N.), supra, note 4. 
25  For an example of the “gross unfairness” test, see R. v. Willocks, [1995] O.J. No. 342, 22 
O.R. (3d) 552, at 571 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
26  See, e.g., Manitoba Rice Farmers, supra, note 21; R. v. Willocks, id.; M. (N.), supra, note 
4; Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [1988] B.C.J. No. 13, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 687 (B.C.C.A.) 
revd on other grounds [1990] S.C.J. No. 123, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451 (S.C.C.); R. v. Music Explosion 
Ltd., [1990] M.J. No. 444, 68 Man. R. (2d) 203 (Man. C.A.), revg [1989] M.J. No. 577, 62 Man. R. 
(2d) 189 (Man. Q.B.); Schafer v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] O.J. No. 1915, 29 O.R. (3d) 
496 (Ont. Gen. Div.), vard [1997] O.J. No. 3231, 35 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); Shewchuk v. Ricard, 
[1986] B.C.J. No. 335, 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, 10 B.C.L.R. (2d) 
xxxvi (S.C.C.). 
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adoption of a narrow or expansive view of section 15(2) depends upon 
this characterization. It is well recognized that Charter rights should be 
interpreted broadly. If section 15(2) is regarded as a restriction or 
exception to equality rights, then it should be interpreted narrowly. 
However, if the subsection is an interpretation or elaboration of equality 
rights, then it should be interpreted expansively. As one commentator 
succinctly put it, treating section 15(2) as an exception to the equality 
guarantee in section 15(1) creates an untenable paradox for those who 
truly advocate the promotion of substantive equality: 
… section 15(2) would encourage the government and legislatures to 
establish affirmative action measures; on the other hand, section 15(1) 
would simultaneously declare them to be a prima facie violation of the 
Charter. This is, of course, an untenable interpretation of sections 15(1) 
and 15(2) of the Canadian Charter.
27
 
What is really at stake in this debate is the degree of deference that 
will be offered to governments to adopt programs or activities assisting 
disadvantaged groups. 
While these questions were difficult enough in the context of 
equality rights claims generally, they become particularly vexing and 
difficult when raised in the context of an under-inclusiveness claim by 
another disadvantaged group. This is where “the rubber hits the road” in 
terms of our understanding of how section 15(2) should relate to section 
15(1) and it is the context that the Court did not have to address in Kapp. 
It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine in some detail how under-
inclusive challenges to ameliorative programs have been dealt with prior 
to Kapp. As will be seen, of critical importance to this history was the 
shift in analysis between the Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
of Canada in Lovelace — which shift would profoundly affect the state 
of the jurisprudence on section 15(2) for the 10 years following. In 
essence, it is that shift that was just revisited by the Court in Kapp. 
3.  Challenges to Affirmative Action Programs by Disadvantaged 
Groups on Under-inclusiveness Grounds: The Lovelace Decisions 
In claims of under-inclusiveness, a difficult choice has to be made as 
to how to balance the need to give governments flexibility to provide 
benefits to assist disadvantaged groups while reserving the right of 
                                                                                                             
27  Vizkelety, supra, note 23, at 307. 
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improperly excluded groups to complain about their exclusion on under-
inclusiveness grounds. The first serious judicial attempt to wrestle with 
section 15(2) in an under-inclusive context was the Ontario Court of 
Appeal‟s decision in Lovelace. While the Supreme Court upheld but did 
not ultimately endorse the approach of the appellate court to section 
15(2), the analysis of the Ontario Court of Appeal is worth careful 
reconsideration. Much of what the Court of Appeal said about section 
15(2) would resound 12 years later in the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Kapp. As such, its analysis of section 15(2) takes on fresh importance as 
an indicator of what we might expect in the difficult analogous under-
inclusive cases that courts will undoubtedly face in the future. 
(a)  The Ontario Court of Appeal Decision: Section 15(2) as an 
Independent Ground Furthering the Guarantee of Equality 
Lovelace
28
 was a challenge to an Ontario government program, in 
conjunction with the Bands of Ontario, to distribute profits from Casino 
Rama on the Rama First Nation Reserve to the registered Bands of 
Ontario. The project was based on an agreement entered into between 
Ontario‟s Bands and the government to develop the commercial casino. 
A variety of Métis and Aboriginal groups, not registered as Bands under 
the Indian Act,
29
 challenged their exclusion from a share of the profits 
from the program as discriminatory under section 15(1) of the Charter. 
Ontario contended that the program was saved by section 15(2) as a 
program with the object of amelioration of a disadvantaged group. The 
lower court accepted the argument of the claimants; however, the Court 
of Appeal reversed the decision and upheld the constitutionality of the 
project, adopting a broad and purposive approach to section 15(2). 
The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed its view of section 15(2) “as 
furthering the guarantee of equality in section 15(1), not as providing an 
exception to it”.30 In doing so, the Court ignored the one nearly 
consistent aspect of the otherwise confusing appellate jurisprudence that 
preceded it. Interestingly, the Court chose to ground its substantive view 
of equality in the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence — and in particular the 
landmark decision of Andrews: 
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… the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently stated that the 
purpose of the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) is to remedy historical 
disadvantage, that identical treatment can perpetuate disadvantage and 
that equality may sometimes require different treatment. Section 15(2) 
enhances this concept of equality by recognizing that achieving 
equality may require positive action by government to improve the 
conditions of historically and socially disadvantaged individuals and 
groups in Canadian society.
31
 
The Court set out the significance of this finding that section 15(2) 
was not an exception to the equality guarantee (distinguishing its decision 
from the vast majority of the section 15(2) cases that preceded it): 
Interpreting s. 15(2) as explaining and enhancing s. 15(1), instead of 
as a defence or exception to it, affects how a s. 15(2) program should 
be analyzed. If s. 15(2) were a defence then it would be invoked only 
after a claim of discrimination under s. 15(1) had been established. 
Interpreting it as we do, s. 15(2) must be considered with s. 15(1) in 
determining whether a claim of discrimination has been established. 
Moreover, because special programs for the disadvantaged further the 
guarantee of equality, government action under s. 15(2) should be 
generously and liberally assessed …32 
That generous and liberal approach translated directly into the Court 
articulating the propriety of a limited judicial scrutiny of ameliorative 
programs, based on both the “words of s. 15(2) and policy considerations”, 
namely, the affirmation of the legitimacy of government laws, programs 
or activities whose object or purpose is the amelioration of the conditions 
of disadvantaged groups or individuals. Under this analysis, there was no 
need for an objective assessment of a program‟s effectiveness — one 
need only look at the target and true purpose of an ameliorative program: 
In other words, if the court is satisfied that the target of the 
government‟s program is a disadvantaged group and the object or 
purpose of the program is to ameliorate the conditions of that group, the 
program fits within s. 15(2). Nothing in s. 15(2) calls on the court, for 
example, to assess the effectiveness of the program or the means used 
to achieve the government‟s ameliorative object or whether a reasonable 
relationship exists between the cause of the disadvantage and the form 
of ameliorative action. If some aspect of the program infringes the 
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equality guarantee, the government‟s rationale or justification … 
should be considered under s. 1 …33 
The Court also emphasized how policy considerations, namely, the 
need to avoid discouraging governments from initiating ameliorative 
programs, also support limited judicial review of section 15(2) programs: 
Governments have no constitutional obligation to remedy all conditions 
of disadvantage in our society. If government affirmative action 
programs can be too readily challenged because, for example, they do 
not go far enough in remedying disadvantage, governments will be 
discouraged from initiating such programs. Governments should be 
able to establish special programs under s. 15(2) that distinguish 
between or even within groups protected under s. 15(1).
34
 
The Court then opined that, while the “language and history of 
s. 15(2) seem to militate against challenges to s. 15(2) programs by 
members of socially advantaged or privileged groups”,35 under-inclusive 
challenges by disadvantaged groups were distinct. In under-inclusive 
claims, one had to distinguish between challenges by disadvantaged 
groups within the object of the program and challenges by disadvantaged 
groups outside the objects of the program: 
A s. 15(2) program that excludes from its reach disadvantaged 
individuals or groups that the program was designed to benefit likely 
infringes s. 15(1). The government would then have to justify the 
exclusion under s. 1.
36
 
The Court, subject to this caveat, affirmed the application of section 
15(2) as an independent ground in under-inclusion claims where the 
claim is made by a “disadvantaged group outside the object of the 
program”. In so doing, it strongly affirmed the need to afford 
governments the flexibility to “target and attempt to remedy specific 
disadvantages”: 
Governments should, therefore, be able to rely on s. 15(2) to provide 
benefits to a specific disadvantaged group and should not have to 
justify excluding other disadvantaged groups even if those other groups 
suffer similar disadvantage. To hold that an affirmative government 
program violates s. 15 because it excludes disadvantaged groups or 
individuals that were never the object of the program would undermine 
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the effectiveness of s. 15(2) and the ability of governments to redress 
disadvantage.
37
 
The Court recognized that its analysis, in the end, came down to a 
proper characterization of the “object or purpose” of the program — the 
“key” to the particular program‟s constitutionality. It also recognized the 
inherent difficulty in that task — and the easy attraction for governments 
to justify ameliorative programs by narrowly defining their purposes — 
effectively insulating them from review. The Court indicated that this 
would be avoided by adopting a purposive approach that looked to the 
“true character or underlying rationale” of a program. Under this approach, 
the Court would be called on to “scrutinize good faith assertions by 
government about purpose and to reject characterizations of purpose that 
are „colourable‟”.38 
In applying its analysis to the case at hand, the Court determined that 
the object of the Casino Rama project was “unquestionably ameliorative”, 
and the intended recipient Bands were clearly “profoundly disadvantaged”. 
Therefore, the only issue that divided the parties was the definition of the 
object or purpose of the program. If the project had been intended to 
benefit all Aboriginal communities, it was clearly under-inclusive. If it 
had been aimed, as Ontario argued, to ameliorate the conditions of 
registered Bands only, then it was not open to other groups, however 
disadvantaged, to challenge it on equality grounds. 
The Court accepted the more narrow objective posited by Ontario. In 
light of the history of the project, the Court found the project had three 
principal objects
39
: (1) to respond to the economic needs of the Bands to 
enable them to improve the condition of Band members, especially those 
living on reserve; (2) to respond to the Bands‟ long-standing interest in 
casino gaming and extensive experience in on-reserve gaming; and (3) to 
respond to the Bands‟ assertions of self-government, particularly their 
assertion that gaming is included in their inherent right of self-
government. Ultimately, the Court found that since the casino was itself 
on a reserve and Ontario‟s dominant concern was to improve the social 
and economic conditions of Band members living on reserves, it was not 
discriminatory for Ontario to single out Bands on reserve for amelioration 
through the Casino Rama program and to exclude the appellate groups 
from a right to a share of the profits. 
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(b)  The Supreme Court Decision in Lovelace: Section 15(2) as an 
Interpretive Aid to the Section 15(1) Equality Guarantee 
In the result, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the 
Court of Appeal. The Court found that the exclusion of these groups 
from the Casino Rama project did not violate section 15 of the Charter 
and further, that the province‟s decision to exclude them from the Casino 
Rama project was not ultra vires the province of Ontario. The similarity 
between the approaches of the two Courts largely ends there. 
(i)  The Relationship of Section 15(2) to Section 15(1) 
A significant development happened between the issuing of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada decision: the 
latter issued its decision in Law.
40
 In that decision, the ameliorative 
nature of a program or activity was one of several “contextual” factors to 
be considered in the determination of dignity under the section 15(1) 
analysis.
41
 
Following Law, the Supreme Court did not follow the Court of 
Appeal‟s interpretation of the interplay between section 15(1) and 
section 15(2). That analysis would have had it begin its Charter analysis 
by first considering whether the program fit the criteria of section 15(2), 
hence eliminating the need to consider section 15(1). Instead, the 
Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeal‟s interpretation of section 
15(2) was decided without the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Law. After considering the Law framework as well as section 15(2), the 
Court concluded that the appeal could be wholly determined on the basis 
of the substantive equality framework of section 15(1). 
Although the Court did not rely on section 15(2) in its judgment, it 
acknowledged the importance of commenting on the interplay between 
sections 15(1) and 15(2) in light of the lower courts‟ decision and the 
argument of the parties. 
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between the ground or grounds on which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or 
circumstances of the claimant or others; (3) the ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law 
upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society; and (4) the nature and scope of the interest 
affected by the impugned law: Law, id., at para. 88. 
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The Court outlined what it saw as the two competing approaches
42
 to 
understanding the application of section 15(2) and its relationship with 
section 15(1): 
1. Section 15(2) is an interpretive aid to section 15(1), providing 
conceptual depth and clarity on the substantive nature of equality; or 
2. Section 15(2) is an exemption or a defence to the applicability of the 
section 15(1) discrimination analysis. 
The Court rejected the interpretation that section 15(2) acts as an 
exception or defence to section 15(1), such that ameliorative programs 
escape section 15(1) scrutiny. Instead, it held that section 15(2) acts as an 
interpretive aid that describes the scope of the section 15(1) right: it is 
“confirmatory and supplementary” to section 15(1) in indicating that the 
substantive equality guarantee of section 15(1) includes ameliorative 
programs. The Court suggested that claimants challenging ameliorative 
programs should first be directed to section 15(1) since that subsection 
can embrace ameliorative programs of the kind that are contemplated by 
section 15(2). The Court noted that through this approach “one can 
ensure that the programs are subject to the full scrutiny of the 
discrimination analysis, as well as the possibility of review under s. 1”. 
While affirming the role of section 15(2) as an interpretation of (as 
opposed to exception to) the substantive equality guarantee, the effect of 
the Court relegating section 15(2) to an “interpretive aid” would be the 
effective end to its significance as an independent ground in the 
jurisprudence leading up to the decision in Kapp. 
Interestingly, in its final comments on the issue, the Court appeared 
to presage its willingness to revisit the relationship of section 15(2) to 
section 15(1), as it did in Kapp, when it stated that “we may well wish to 
reconsider this matter at a future time in the context of another case”.43 
(ii)  Correspondence Analysis: Groundwork for Future Confusion 
Instead of carrying out the comparative analysis of the situation of 
the claimant and beneficiary groups within the section 15(2) analysis (as 
the Ontario Court of Appeal did) the hard work of comparison of the 
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situations of the groups in relation to the program was done in the newly 
articulated “correspondence” factor articulated in Law. Unfortunately, as 
was ultimately acknowledged by the Supreme Court 12 years later in 
Kapp, this analysis suffered from a certain lack of clarity, rendering it 
difficult to apply consistently. 
The correspondence analysis ultimately invites a comparison between 
three things: (1) the needs and circumstances of the claimant group; (2) 
the beneficiary group; and (3) the program, law or activity being 
challenged. Yet, unlike the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s straightforward 
analysis under section 15(2) (did the claimant group fit (or not fit) within 
the intent of the object of the impugned ameliorative measure?), the 
Supreme Court was not precisely clear in determining how these three 
were to be compared in correspondence — and how that comparison was 
ultimately related to whether or not human dignity was offended. The 
Court did explain in Law that “legislation which takes into account the 
actual needs, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant and others with 
similar traits in a manner that respects their value as human beings and 
members of Canadian society will be less likely to have a negative effect 
on human dignity”.44 While this is difficult to dispute as a matter of 
principle, as a practical test to apply, it is elusive at best. The Court‟s 
subsequent decision in Lovelace did not help to elucidate the analysis. 
For example, as the test is initially stated, picking up on the language 
of Law, the assessment of correspondence is between “the grounds” of 
discrimination and the actual needs, capacities and circumstances of the 
claimant.
45
 This is a somewhat different comparison then that referred to 
in Law as being between the actual needs, capacity or circumstances of 
the claimants and the impugned “legislation” (or object of the program or 
activity). And it is precisely this comparison (to the impugned program 
or activity) that the Court does actually apply here: 
I accept that the needs of the appellants correspond to the needs 
addressed by the casino program, for both the appellant and respondent 
aboriginal communities face these same social problems. However, the 
correspondence consideration requires more than establishing a 
common need. If only a common need were the norm, governments 
would be placed in the untenable position of having to rank populations 
without paying any attention to the unique circumstances and 
capabilities of potential program beneficiaries. I turn, therefore, to a 
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consideration of the correspondence between the actual needs, 
capacities, and circumstances on the one hand, and the program on the 
other. In so doing, it becomes evident that the appellant aboriginal 
communities have very different relations with respect to the land, 
government, and gaming from those anticipated by the casino program.
46
 
In applying (and building upon) the Law analysis, the Court in 
Lovelace recognized the importance of the Casino Rama project as a 
“partnered initiative” designed to address several needs at once: to 
regulate reserve-based gambling activities; to support the development of 
a government-to-government relationship between First Nations Bands 
and Ontario; and to ameliorate the social, cultural and economic 
conditions of Band communities.
47
 
In examining the details of the program and the actual situation of 
the appellant groups, the Court concluded that they had very different 
relations with respect to land, government and gaming from those 
anticipated by the casino project.
48
 
Turning next to the ameliorative nature of the program, the Court 
upheld the finding that the casino program was “designed to redress 
historical disadvantage and contribute to enhancing the dignity and 
recognition of bands in Canadian society”. The purpose of the program 
was, therefore, consistent with section 15(1) “since it is not associated 
with a misconception as to their actual needs, capacities and 
circumstances”.49 This last consideration raises an issue that had to be 
wrestled with by future courts:
50
 is it enough to demonstrate lack of 
correspondence to find this factor weighs in favour of a discrimination 
finding, or must the absence of correspondence be based upon a 
prejudicial “misconception”? 
(iii) Significance of the Lovelace S.C.C. Analysis Leading up to Kapp 
The analysis of the Supreme Court in Lovelace had the following 
hallmarks that were to define the equality jurisprudence for the years 
leading up to Kapp: 
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 First, section 15(2) no longer had any independent application 
(although the Court reserved for itself the right to revisit that in the 
future). 
 Second, the ameliorative aspect of a program (determinative under 
the Ontario Court of Appeal analysis) became relegated to one 
contextual factor in the dignity analysis. 
 Third, the consideration of the ameliorative nature of the program 
was disconnected from the analysis of the objectives of the program 
in relation to the situation of the claimants: The real work fell to the 
newly articulated “correspondence factor”, now separated from the 
ameliorative factor and defined as “the correspondence, or lack 
thereof, between the ground or grounds on which the claim is based 
and the actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or 
others”. 
 Fourth, the analysis of the contextual “human dignity” factors, and in 
particular the correspondence analysis, was complex and difficult to 
apply. 
4.  Section 15(2) Jurisprudence Following Lovelace: Sparring over 
Correspondence in the Ameliorative Context 
The jurisprudence considering under-inclusive claims against 
ameliorative programs that followed the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Lovelace reflects both a markedly diminished significance being attached 
to section 15(2), and a lack of consistency in the application of the 
correspondence factor. 
The diminished significance is starkly reflected in the sparse case 
law that considers section 15(2), generally giving the subsection only 
cursory attention as an interpretative aid to section 15(1). Not surprisingly, 
in the face of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s decision in Lovelace, no 
case actually relied on section 15(2) to explicitly uphold an otherwise 
unconstitutional provision. Those cases that did consider in some detail 
the Lovelace analysis betray some of the difficulty evident in it. 
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(a)  Application of Correspondence in Non-Aboriginal Context: 
Wynberg v. Ontario 
One particularly revealing example (in the non-Aboriginal context) 
of the interplay of the correspondence factors, their link to human dignity 
and the significance of a finding that a program is ameliorative can be 
found in the 2006 decision of Wynberg v. Ontario (Attorney General).
51
 
Wynberg was a section 15 challenge to the Ontario government‟s 
program to provide assistance to pre-school autistic children between the 
ages of two and five years (the IEIP program). The claimants, 
representing autistic children over the age of six and their parents, 
alleged a violation of section 15(1) on the grounds of age and disability. 
The lower court upheld the violation on the grounds that the age cut-off 
reflected and reinforced the stereotype that autistic children age six and 
over are virtually irredeemable. 
This analysis was overturned on appeal. The Court held that in the 
claim of age discrimination, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the 
claimant group had suffered from historic disadvantage as a result of 
stereotyping on the basis of age, rather than autism. The appellate court 
found that the cut-off did not reinforce pre-existing prejudicial attitudes 
towards older autistic children because of their age. 
On the critical correspondence analysis, the Court of Appeal found 
that the program corresponded to the capacities and circumstances of 
autistic children in the targeted group. In coming to this finding, the 
Appeal Court gave detailed consideration to the third contextual factor in 
Law as analyzed in Lovelace. Using section 15(2) as an interpretive aid, 
the Court found that the IEIP program was an ameliorative program. 
More importantly, it rejected the distinctions drawn by the lower court 
between the IEIP program and the program found in Lovelace to be non-
discriminatory. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the trial judge‟s distinction of Lovelace 
on two points in relation to correspondence, namely, that (unlike the IEIP 
program) the program at issue in Lovelace was a partnership between the 
government and the targeted disadvantaged group, rendering the 
correspondence between the program and the targeted group more close 
in Lovelace. The Court rejected this distinction on the grounds that such 
input is not required by the correspondence factor, and both cases 
reflected a high degree of correspondence, satisfying the requirement. 
                                                                                                             
51  Id. 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) LOVELACE AND LAW REVISITED 301 
Second, the trial judge found that the exclusion of the claimant was 
associated with “a misconception about the actual needs, capacities and 
circumstances of the excluded group”, namely, that the IEIP mistakenly 
assumed that the claimant group would have their needs met in school 
through the special education programs being offered. Thus, the trial 
judge found that the Lovelace conclusion that the exclusion from a 
targeted ameliorative program was less likely to be discriminatory did 
not apply. The Court of Appeal rejected the significance of this finding, 
reflecting on Lovelace: 
In our view, the Court was speaking of the kind of misconception it 
described at para. 71, namely one that reflects stereotyping of the 
excluded group because it unfairly portrays them or tends to demean 
their human dignity. If such a misconception is the basis for the 
exclusion, that would indeed undermine the purpose of s. 15(1) of the 
Charter. A misunderstanding that does not demean their human dignity 
would not undermine that purpose. 
In this case, the IEIP assumed that the needs of the claimant group 
would be met through appropriate special education programs. The trial 
judge found that this was mistaken. However, assuming the trial judge 
is correct, in our view that does not constitute a misconception as that 
notion was used in Lovelace. It does not portray autistic children age 
six and over as not being disadvantaged or not having special needs. It 
does not unfairly portray them as having traits that they do not possess, 
nor does it tend to demean their human dignity. The mistaken premise 
therefore does not undermine the acknowledged ameliorative purpose 
of the IEIP, a purpose that is consistent with s. 15(1) of the Charter. It 
is not the sort of misconception referred to in Lovelace, and it is not a 
basis for refusing to apply the Lovelace conclusion.
52
 
This revealing disagreement between the trial judge and Court of 
Appeal reflected the confusing interplay of the correspondence analysis, 
and how it was to be carried out in the context of an ameliorative 
program satisfying section 15(2). Specifically: (1) was correspondence a 
“human dignity” factor entirely independent of the ameliorative nature of 
the program? (2) how did the correspondence analysis change in the 
context of a program determined to be ameliorative? and, most 
importantly: (3) what degree of flexibility, if any, was to be afforded to 
governments fashioning ameliorative programs? For example, was the 
ameliorative nature of a program to be discounted for purposes of the 
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equality analysis (as the trial judge found) because the program was 
based, in part, upon an incorrect premise about a claimant group? Or was 
the government permitted to get a premise wrong in relation to a 
claimant group so long as the error or “misconception” did not 
undermine the group‟s human dignity by portraying it in a stereotyped 
way (as the Court of Appeal found)? 
These were fundamental and basic questions which the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Wynberg and other lower courts
53
 had to wrestle with 
in the absence of any clear direction on correspondence in under-
inclusive challenges to ameliorative programs following Lovelace. Like 
Lovelace (and again in Kapp) it was in the Aboriginal context that these 
questions were (and continue to be) raised with the most vexing urgency. 
(b)  Application of Correspondence in the Aboriginal Context 
In crafting programs aimed at specific Aboriginal groups, the 
government has often created programs that, on their face, make difficult 
and critical distinctions based on “race” or other analogous grounds. The 
Constitution itself requires deciding who is an “Indian” for purposes of 
determining the parameters of Parliament‟s jurisdiction.54 But the myriad 
of distinctions that have to be drawn do not end with questions of 
jurisdiction under section 91(24). Programming has to determine such 
things as who can be registered as an Indian, who can vote for a Band 
council, what benefits are available to registered Indian Bands, and what 
benefits are available to members depending on whether they live on- or 
off-reserve. Needless to say, this reality poses particularly difficult 
challenges to governments seeking to fashion ameliorative programming 
aimed at the diverse and complex Aboriginal population. In recent years, 
there have been an increasing number of challenges brought by 
Aboriginal claimants to distinctions in government programming that 
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they consider to be under-inclusive, discriminatory and/or not reflective 
of their own vision of who they are. 
Even prior to Law and Lovelace, the Supreme Court signalled its 
willingness to uphold equality rights challenges to distinctions in 
programming or legislation aimed at Aboriginal people. In Corbiere v. 
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs),
55
 the Supreme Court 
found that restrictions preventing off-reserve Band members from voting 
in Band elections were discriminatory under section 15(1). In this 
context, the Supreme Court established that residence for Aboriginal 
people could be an analogous ground under section 15 and therefore, 
serve as a marker of discrimination. In so doing, it made it clear, 
however, that reserve status should not be confused with ordinary 
residence given the enormously complex decisions Aboriginal Band 
members face in deciding to live on- or off-reserve. Further, it found that 
certain inherent “embedded” analogous grounds were necessary to 
permit meaningful consideration of intra-group discrimination. 
(i)  Correspondence Analysis in Challenges to Pan-Aboriginal 
Ameliorative Programming: Misquadis and Gallant 
One interesting example of the difficulties of programming 
ambitious ameliorative programs (and the complexity of analyzing them 
from a substantive equality perspective) was made evident in challenges 
to the federal Aboriginal Human Resources Development Strategy 
(“AHRDS”) following Lovelace. 
Under AHRDS, the federal government transferred funds to certain 
Aboriginal organizations for them to develop, design and deliver human 
resources programming to benefit all Aboriginal people, regardless of 
reserve status or where they lived. One of the challenges in the 
programming was the choice of which Aboriginal organizations the 
government was going to enter into agreements with and transfer funds 
to. The government transferred the funds to one of two different kinds of 
Aboriginal organization: (1) a provincial or regional organization 
affiliated with one of the three big national Aboriginal organizations (the 
Assembly of First Nations (“AFN”), the Métis National Council 
(“MNC”) and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (“ITC”)); or (2) an 
Aboriginal organization chosen under the Urban/Off-reserve Component 
of the strategy. Under this Component, the Aboriginal organization was 
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chosen one of two ways — either by consensus among Aboriginals 
living within a jurisdiction, or, if no consensus existed, by a transparent 
Request for Proposal (“RFP”) process. 
In the first challenge, Misquadis v. Canada (Attorney General)
56
 
claimant groups representing urban Aboriginal communities in Toronto 
and Niagara and a non-status Aboriginal organization in Eastern Ontario 
challenged the strategy on the grounds that they had been denied 
“community control” — a key benefit of the program. 
The lower court applications judge, Lemieux J., accepted the 
characterization of the claimant and comparator groups proposed by the 
claimants, that is, the claimants were “[f]irst nation members of urban 
and off-reserve Aboriginal communities” as compared to “[f]irst nation 
members living on reserve.” He then accepted that the claimants had 
been denied the opportunity to have “local control” of their human 
resource programming and that this denial was on the grounds of 
Aboriginality-residence within the meaning of Corbiere. 
The Federal Court of Appeal appeared ill at ease with both of these 
rulings, noting that “another judge” may have come to a different 
conclusion, including that the real objective of AHRDS was to provide 
employment training for Aboriginals, with local community control 
being only one way of meeting that objective. It did not, however, 
constitute a palpable error as there was some evidence to support it.
57
 
Second, the determination that the analogous ground was “Aboriginality-
residence” did not entirely fit the situation of the claimants who were 
drawn from groups including non-status Indians who did not have the 
right to live on-reserve. Nevertheless, since it found the government had 
not argued this distinction, it was not necessary to draw it — and the 
Court of Appeal did not overrule the lower court decision on point.
58
 
It also upheld Lemieux J.‟s finding that since the primary benefit of 
the strategy was local community control, the program had the effect of 
treating Band and non-Band communities differently as the claimant 
group could not enter into the first kind of AHRDA (with regional and 
provincial affiliates of AFN, MNC and ITC) but instead had to be served 
by organizations chosen by the government to service Aboriginal people 
not living in reserve-based communities. These AHRDAs were found to 
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be fundamentally different as they did not provide the same opportunity 
for local community control.
59
 
In respect of the dignity analysis the lower court found (and the 
Court of Appeal upheld as not being “palpably in error”) that the strategy 
could not be upheld on correspondence grounds since “there was no 
reliable evidence that the [claimants‟] needs, capacities and circumstances 
were any different from those of Aboriginals living on-reserve”.60 
Further, the Appeal Court upheld Lemieux J.‟s findings that AHRDS 
was a general ameliorative program designed to benefit all Aboriginals 
regardless of where they lived — and had failed, therefore to recognize 
that the respondents lived in communities worthy of recognition.
61
 It 
dismissed the government‟s appeal. Leave to appeal the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada was not sought. 
The Misquadis case raises many difficult questions about the 
comparative and correspondence analysis in intra-group under-inclusive 
discrimination challenges to ameliorative programs. First, as noted by the 
Federal Court of Appeal, it took a very broad approach to the Corbiere 
“Aboriginality-residence” analogous ground — including non-status 
Aboriginal people within it — when the Supreme Court appeared to be 
very careful to restrict that analogous ground to off-reserve Band 
members. Further, it appears to take this analysis away from its core 
concept of residence. Second, the identified comparator group of reserve-
based versus non-reserve communities appears to be a selective 
comparison of the groups that were actually receiving the benefit of the 
first AHRDA‟s — including Métis and Inuit communities — none of 
which were reserve-based. Third, the decision appears to give short 
consideration to the complex correspondence analysis, finding that there 
was no reliable evidence that the needs, capacities and circumstances of 
the claimants were different than the needs of First Nations reserve-based 
communities. The analysis appeared to turn on a finding of common 
need instead of any in-depth analysis of the different circumstances of 
the claimant groups. 
Interestingly, the same program was challenged in a very similar 
case — but with a very different result — in Canada v. Gallant.62 In 
Gallant, the applications judge, following Misquadis, found that the 
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government‟s decision to enter into a single AHRDA in the province of 
Prince Edward Island was an unjustified violation of the equality rights 
of the respondents, based on their status as off-reserve Aboriginal people 
of P.E.I. The applications judge found it discriminatory under section 15 
of the Charter that the single P.E.I. Agreement concluded with the 
representative organization of the on-reserve Aboriginals of P.E.I. (the 
Mi‟kmaq Confederacy) gave a benefit of “community control” over the 
Agreement to on-reserve Aboriginals, but not to off-reserve Aboriginals. 
The Court of Appeal overturned this finding on the grounds that no 
evidence existed to establish that the AHRDA funds “were not fairly and 
equitably distributed in PEI to Aboriginals, including off-reserve 
Aboriginals”.63 The Court then made a noteworthy finding that the 
“community control” the Applicants were allegedly deprived of “is in 
fact created by the Indian Act as a result of section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867”.64 Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that 
the case before it could be based on “community control”, since the 
evidence established that the program “was not directed at „community 
control‟, but at the „fair and equitable distribution of funds‟”.65 
The discrepancy with Misquadis is striking in light of the fact that 
the very same program was being challenged, albeit in a different 
geographical context. What could explain this discrepancy? It appears, 
again, that the lack of clarity in respect of the analysis of an under-
inclusive claim to an ameliorative program opens the door to courts 
(including in this case a different panel of the same court) to adopt a very 
different analysis of the same program. Is it realistic to expect greater 
consistency in such challenges, following the Supreme Court of 
Canada‟s decision in Kapp? 
III. A NEW DIRECTION FOR SUBSECTIONS 15(1) AND 15(2) IN KAPP 
1.  The Majority Restates and Refocuses the Inquiry under  
Section 15(1) 
One of the primary challenges in the section 15(1) equality analysis 
has always been how to assess whether a particular distinction that is 
based on a protected ground is discriminatory. The majority‟s decision in 
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Kapp
66
 again focused on this fundamental equality rights issue. 
Beginning their reasons by squarely anchoring themselves in the Court‟s 
seminal decision in Andrews,
67
 McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. re-
emphasized section 15(1)‟s purpose as a tool for furthering substantive, 
and not formal, equality. This conceptualization of equality has always 
been a common theme of the Court‟s equality jurisprudence, from its 
first consideration in Andrews, through to the reformulation of the 
framework for section 15(1) in Law, and beyond. It was also the starting 
point of the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s decision in Lovelace,68 which 
squarely put the ameliorative nature of the program as the front and 
centre consideration governing equality rights challenges to ameliorative 
programs. 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J. restated the inquiry under 
section 15(1) as a two-stage test, as opposed to the three-step test that the 
court had devised under Law: 
1. Has there been a distinction on an enumerated or analogous ground? 
(formerly the first two stages of the Law test) 
2. Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice 
or stereotyping? 
The majority then addressed and appeared to accept many of the 
critiques that have been levelled at the Law test. Chief Justice McLachlin 
and Abella J. traced much of the difficulties with Law to the centring of 
the equality inquiry around a claimant‟s human dignity. Referencing 
Dickson C.J.C.‟s statement in Oakes,69 the majority pointed out that the 
concept of dignity underlies all of the rights in the Charter, and was not 
solely relevant to section 15(1).
70
 Moreover, the Chief Justice and Abella 
J. commented that not only is the concept of dignity inherently abstract 
and subjective, the requirement to demonstrate an infringement of “human 
dignity” has become an “additional burden on equality claimants”.71 
For this reason, the majority suggested that the more useful focus for 
courts in determining whether there has been a breach of section 15(1) is 
on the factors that “identify impact amounting to discrimination”. In 
other words, the majority cautioned that the contextual factors articulated 
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in Law should be used not as a hard and fast test for discrimination, but 
rather as indicators or hallmarks of whether discrimination exists in a 
particular case.
72
 
In this way, the decision in Kapp does not articulate a new test for 
discrimination so much as it affirms the approach to substantive equality 
under section 15 in Andrews and set out in numerous subsequent 
decisions. The majority emphasized that section 15 has dual purposes, 
and that the focus of section 15(1) is on preventing discriminatory 
distinctions, while the focus in section 15(2) is on enabling governments 
to take proactive, affirmative measures to combat discrimination.
73
 
2.  The Majority Articulates a New Vision for Section 15(2) 
The majority then turned to an assessment of section 15(2) and its 
application to the case. The majority begins its discussion by noting that 
in Lovelace, the Court had “appeared unwilling” to find that section 
15(2) had independent force but had left open the possibility that this 
might be reconsidered in future. As noted above, there, Iacobucci J. had 
elaborated on two possible options for the interpretation of section 15(1): 
either that the provision could be used as an interpretive aid to section 
15(1) (the approach the Court would adopt), or that it could function as 
exception or exemption to the operation of 15(1). 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J. proposed a so-called “third 
option” for the interpretation of section 15(2) — that if the government 
could demonstrate that an impugned program meets the criteria of 
section 15(2), then it is unnecessary to conduct a section 15(1) analysis at 
all. The majority emphasized that the two subsections of section 15 
should be read together as both preventing and enabling governments to 
combat discrimination. As such, they cautioned that section 15(1) should 
not be read in a way that finds an ameliorative program aimed at 
combating discrimination to be discriminatory. While it is described as a 
“third option”, this really appears to be a reiteration of precisely what the 
Ontario Court of Appeal set out in its Lovelace decision, overturned on 
point by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it is a critical reaffirmation of 
the substantive law purpose underlying section 15(2). More importantly, 
it holds out the promise of making the ameliorative nature of a program 
the primary consideration when conducting a comparison of the actual 
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needs, capacities and circumstances of the beneficiary and claimant 
groups in reference to the ameliorative goals of the impugned measure. 
In the majority‟s view, the framework for such an analysis proceeds 
as follows. Once a section 15 claimant demonstrates a distinction based 
on a protected ground, the government has the opportunity to 
demonstrate that the impugned law, program or activity is ameliorative 
to a disadvantaged group, and therefore not a violation of section 15. If 
the government fails to meet this burden, then the Court must then assess 
whether the program is discriminatory under section 15(1). 
In adopting this third approach to dealing with section 15(2), the 
majority focused on two issues: 
1.  whether courts should look to the purpose or the effect of the 
legislation in question; and 
2.  whether a program must have an ameliorative purpose as its sole 
object or if this can be one of several objects. 
On the first question, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. held that based 
on the language of section 15(2), the focus of the inquiry should be on 
the legislation‟s purpose and not its effect. This is very close to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal‟s articulation of how the “objects” analysis 
should proceed when it rejected the need to conduct any assessment of 
the “effectiveness of the program or the means used to achieve the 
government‟s ameliorative object”.74 Noting the concern that this 
approach would lead to a purely subjective analysis of a program‟s 
intended purpose, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. suggested that this 
concern could be very easily addressed. They noted that it was the 
Court‟s role to assess the genuineness of the legislative purpose when 
faced with an argument that a program ought to be protected under 
section 15(2). Again, this closely reiterates the analysis of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Lovelace that emphasized the need for the court to 
vigilantly and objectively assess the “true character or underlying 
rationale” for an ameliorative scheme.75 
Unlike the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lovelace, the Supreme Court 
articulated a “rational connection” inquiry as to objective as follows: 
“Was it rational for the state to conclude that the means chosen to reach 
its ameliorative goal would contribute to that purpose?”76 Interestingly, 
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in coming to that inquiry, the Court quoted and relied upon the Manitoba 
Court of Queen‟s Bench decision in Manitoba Rice Farmers, canvassed 
earlier. That decision found that the government had to demonstrate a 
“real nexus between the object program as declared by the government 
and its form and implementation. It is not sufficient to declare that the 
object is to help a disadvantaged group if in fact the ameliorative remedy 
is not directed towards the cause of the disadvantage”.77 As previously 
discussed, this decision was the object of some academic criticism for 
imposing too onerous an obligation on government to establish an 
ameliorative program that addressed the “causes of the disadvantage”.78 
How does one prove that — especially if the causes of disadvantage are 
related to complex social phenomena? Interestingly, the requirement to 
link the object to the cause of the disadvantage (which is at the heart of 
the academic debate about the Manitoba Rice Farmers decision), while 
quoted by the Court in Kapp,
79
 is not repeated in the actual articulation of 
the rational connection test.
80
 
On the second question, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. held that an 
ameliorative purpose need not be the sole object of a particular program 
that falls under the ambit of section 15(2). They noted that government 
programs may have a number of goals, and that it would undermine the 
purpose of section 15(2) to require that a protected program have 
amelioration of a disadvantaged group as its sole object. 
Applied to the facts of this case, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. held 
that while the granting of the communal fishing licence created a 
distinction based on race, the program could be justified under section 
15(2). Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J. held that the program had 
an ameliorative purpose, and that this was targeted at a disadvantaged 
group. For these reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that 
the program did not infringe the claimants‟ section 15 rights. 
Kapp‟s significance for challenges to ameliorative programs cannot 
be overstated. The decision reaffirms the strong and independent role of 
section 15(2), first set out in Andrews, as an articulation of the 
commitment to substantive equality. Kapp also reverses Law‟s 
consideration of the ameliorative nature of a program as but one factor in 
the dignity analysis. The overly complex “correspondence” analysis, 
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especially difficult to apply in challenges to ameliorative programs, 
appears to be downplayed, although not explicitly abandoned or 
replaced. In fact, none of the contextual factors set out in the Law dignity 
analysis are explicitly abandoned. While the Court explicitly rejected 
their rote application — as if they were legislative provisions — it 
remains very much to be determined whether they may have continuing 
relevance to the analysis. And this may include the contextual factor 
considering the ameliorative nature of the program. Is it possible an 
ameliorative program not strictly satisfying the requirements of section 
15(2) could still be upheld, in part, on the grounds of having an 
ameliorative purpose as a contextual factor underlying dignity? That 
appears to be an open question. 
Most significantly, in its focus on purpose as opposed to 
effectiveness, the decision sets out a fairly deferential and contextual 
approach to ameliorative programs, subject to the somewhat perplexing 
reference to the Manitoba Rice Farmers decision and its requirement to 
link object with the “cause of the disadvantage”. 
Kapp also does not explicitly overturn another of the more 
controversial developments arising from or since Law, the comparator 
group analysis. Furthermore, it does not address how courts should apply 
section 15 in the more challenging context of a claim of under-
inclusiveness, or what the role of section 15(2) should be in those kinds 
of challenges. For example, does section 15(2) stand as an independent 
ground for determining discrimination only when challenges are brought 
by advantaged groups to ameliorative programs? Certainly, that was not 
the approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lovelace (the closest 
predecessor to Kapp in approach): that Court pointed out that there is 
nothing in the legislative history or substantive equality reasoning 
underlying section 15(2) that would justify restricting it to claims by 
advantaged groups. After all, that subsection affirms that governments 
may target and attempt to remedy specific disadvantage. Governments 
should not have to justify excluding other disadvantaged groups, even if 
they suffer similar disadvantage. As the Court pointed out, any less 
deferential approach would undermine the substantive equality purpose 
and effectiveness of section 15(2) by limiting the ability of governments 
to redress disadvantage.
81
 
It is thus not yet clear how challenges by competing disadvantaged 
groups will be carried out post-Kapp, and how the legitimate right to 
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challenge discriminatory under-inclusiveness will be balanced against 
the flexibility governments require in order to facilitate and encourage 
ameliorative programming necessary to the advancement of substantive 
equality. 
IV. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF KAPP 
No case has yet answered the above questions directly, and the few 
post-Kapp section 15 cases are only somewhat revealing. The cases are 
most notable, perhaps, for the observation that while Kapp has certainly 
overtaken Law as the seminal decision on section 15, the full scope of its 
impact remains unknown. The post-Kapp cases have generally noted the 
decision‟s reformulation and refocusing of the equality analysis. 
However, they vary in terms of whether and the extent to which Kapp is 
viewed as a truly transformative decision, or merely a restatement or 
refocusing of the Law analysis. 
In Downey v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
Tribunal),
82
 for example, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal stated, in a 
brief notation, that the framework for analyzing section 15 remains “the 
same in substance”.83 In that case, the plaintiff had challenged the cap on 
pain-related impairments of six per cent that was used to calculate his 
benefits. He claimed that this cap on pain-related impairments violated 
his equality rights because it did not reflect his level of disability or 
impairment as fully as impairment ratings for other injuries and 
conditions. In dismissing the appeal, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
held that there was differential treatment on a protected ground, but that 
this distinction did not amount to discrimination. 
In Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),
84
 on the other hand, the 
majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal emphasized that Kapp 
represented a shift away from the equality jurisprudence of the previous 
decade. Withler was an age-based challenge to certain provisions of the 
Canadian Forces Superannuation Act
85
 and the Public Service 
Superannuation Act.
86
 In her majority opinion, Ryan J.A. discussed the 
significance of Kapp on the equality analysis. Justice Ryan noted that the 
decision in Law broadened the discrimination inquiry and proposed a 
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specific four-part test for the assessment of discrimination. She observed 
that Kapp refocuses the analysis away from this fixed test and that: 
Kapp has reminded the courts that the essential question under s. 15(1) 
is whether the distinction created by the impugned legislation is based 
on personal characteristics of an individual or group that has the effect 
of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual 
or group not imposed on others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of 
society. In making this inquiry, the legislation must be placed in context 
which the four factors described in Law may help to delineate.
87
 
As part of a larger, comprehensive insurance and pension scheme 
designed to deal with and accommodate the changing needs of an 
individual, the majority held that the plan may not have provided a 
perfect fit for each individual, but could not be considered discriminatory. 
The majority concluded that none of the contextual factors from Law 
acted as indicators of discrimination. They found that the plan was a 
broad-based scheme meant to accommodate the competing interests of 
various age groups covered by it. As such, the impugned provisions did 
not discriminate against the appellants. 
One post-Kapp decision that has applied section 15(2) to save a 
government scheme from a charge of discrimination is the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal‟s decision in Re Marshall Estate.88 In that case, the 
Court considered whether the provisions of various provincial Acts 
barring the appellant, an adopted child, from claiming a right of 
succession in her birth mother‟s estate, violated the appellant‟s section 
15 rights. The appellant argued that the law drew a distinction between 
her and natural children on the basis of her adopted status, and that this 
distinction was discriminatory as it perpetuated the historic differential 
treatment of adopted persons. 
Most interesting about the decision is the Court‟s finding that while 
the provisions drew a distinction on the basis of an analogous ground, 
they were nonetheless ameliorative for adopted individuals and therefore 
the provisions were protected under section 15(2). The Court accepted 
that adopted status was an immutable characteristic, and therefore 
protected as an analogous ground under section 15. The Court also 
accepted that the provisions drew a distinction between the appellant and 
non-adopted children on the basis of her adopted status. 
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However, Fichaud J.A., for the Court, held that the provisions aimed 
to better integrate adoptees into their families‟ lives, and therefore treated 
adoptees equivalently as birth children of their adoptive parents. For this 
reason, Fichaud J.A. held that the legislation did not perpetuate 
stereotyping of adoptees, nor did it signal that adopted children are “less 
deserving of concern, respect, and consideration”. Rather, in his view, 
the provisions were ameliorative, and therefore saved under section 
15(2).
89
 
The only case from the Supreme Court to have applied section 15(1) 
post-Kapp is the decision in Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. 
Canada.
90
 In that case, the Bands claimed that the Crown had fiduciary 
obligations to invest oil and gas royalties on behalf of the Bands, rather 
than depositing them into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
As part of their claims, the Bands challenged the constitutional 
validity of subsection 61 to section 68 of the Indian Act as being 
discriminatory against them, contrary to section 15(1). They argued that 
if the Court found that those provisions precluded the Crown from 
investing the royalties in the manner of a common law trustee, the result 
was discriminatory. They argued that because they were Indians, they 
had been deprived by the Indian Act of the rights available to non-
Indians whose property was held in trust by the Crown. 
The Court dismissed the appeals and held that the Crown had neither 
the obligation nor the authority to invest the appellants‟ royalties. What 
is most interesting about the Ermineskin decision from the section 15 
standpoint is that the Court‟s treatment of section 15(1) makes no 
reference to Law, the four factors from Law or the concept of human 
dignity. Instead, Rothstein J., for the Court, looked at the impugned 
distinction from a contextual viewpoint and concluded that the 
distinction is and was intended to benefit the Bands — through increased 
liquidity — rather than disadvantage them. For this reason, Rothstein J. 
held that the distinction was not discriminatory. The provisions did not 
preclude investment, provided the investments were made by the Bands 
or trustees on their behalf after expenditure of funds from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund to the Bands and the release of the Crown 
from further responsibility with respect to the royalties. 
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V. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR SECTION 15  
IN LIGHT OF KAPP? 
While Kapp
91
 represents a point of departure for the analysis under 
section 15(1), it remains to be seen whether the decision will truly alter 
the jurisprudential landscape in the years to come. The Court‟s 
reformulation of the test under section 15(1) is most notable in its 
refocusing the section 15(1) analysis back to its origins in Andrews
92
 and 
its departure from the focus on human dignity, as set out in Law.
93
 
Certain aspects of this reformulation are benign — for example, the re-
articulation of the test for equality as a two-step, rather than a three-step 
process. 
One of the main criticisms that the Court appears to accept in Kapp 
was that the Law test, in delineating its four contextual factors, created a 
rather rigid test for discrimination that in the end proved to be an 
additional burden to equality-seekers. One looming question that remains 
is whether this new formulation of the section 15(1) analysis will, in fact, 
alter the “burdens” for section 15 claimants in this analysis. The onus 
still remains on claimants to demonstrate that a particular law, program 
or activity draws a distinction between them and others on the basis of a 
protected ground. At the same time, claimants must show that the 
distinction is discriminatory, and may still draw upon the four “indicators 
of discrimination” as set out in Law. 
This refocusing of the section 15(1) analysis, whereby the focus 
moves away from the consideration of contextual factors as indicators of 
“human dignity”, but becomes hallmarks or indicators of discrimination, 
may well represent Kapp‟s most significant impact on the section 15(1) 
analysis. However, it is again unclear how substantial a departure this 
development will ultimately represent. It is important to note that this 
interpretation of Law is consonant with Iacobucci J.‟s original 
positioning of the factors as a set of non-exclusive factors for the 
consideration of whether a claimant‟s dignity has been infringed. As 
Iacobucci J. held in Law: 
There is a variety of factors which may be referred to by a s. 15(1) 
claimant in order to demonstrate that legislation has the effect of 
demeaning his or her dignity, as dignity is understood for the purpose 
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of the Charter equality guarantee. In these reasons I discuss four such 
factors in particular, although, as I discuss below, there are undoubtedly 
others, and not all four factors will necessarily be relevant in every 
case.
94
 
Moreover, while there has been much criticism of Law for 
delineating a rigid approach to assessing discrimination under section 
15(1), the Supreme Court has never required the presence or absence of 
any or all of these factors as a pre-condition to a finding of a violation or 
non-violation of section 15(1). In many cases, while there is an ultimate 
determination of whether a distinction discriminates, the analysis of 
individual contextual factors from Law is mixed in terms of whether they 
indicate in favour of a finding of discrimination. Indeed, one of the major 
criticisms of the Law analysis has been the fact that the second factor 
from Law (correspondence) has become the defining factor for 
determining whether a particular distinction is held to be discriminatory.
95
 
As noted in some detail above, it is the correspondence analysis that has 
been so vexing and elusive a factor, resulting in a complex and difficult-
to-apply analysis. The downplaying of this factor, at a minimum, should 
raise hopes that a simpler and more straightforward comparative 
analysis, along the lines of the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s decision in 
Lovelace,
96
 may be forthcoming. In the end, however, a comparative 
analysis cannot be avoided. 
A further criticism that the Court appears to accept in Kapp is that 
the focus on comparator groups in Law (and in decisions post-Law) has 
allowed “the formalism of the … jurisprudence to resurface in the form 
of an artificial comparator analysis focussed on treating likes alike”.97 
The Supreme Court has always recognized that analysis of 
discrimination is an inherently comparative exercise. As the Court noted 
in Andrews, an individual‟s claim under section 15(1) can only be 
determined “by comparison with the conditions of others in the social 
                                                                                                             
94  Law, id., at para. 62 (emphasis added).  
95  See in particular cases such as Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the 
Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.). See also Bruce 
Ryder, Cidalia Faria & Emily Lawrence, “What‟s Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of 
Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103, for a discussion and analysis of this 
issue. 
96  Supra, note 4. 
97  Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 22. See also Sophia Moreau, “Equality Rights and the 
Relevance of Comparator Groups” (2006) 5 J. L. & Equality 81. 
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and political setting in which the question arises”.98 With the Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Hodge99 in 2005, the comparator group analysis 
emerged as one of the pivotal issues to the Court‟s approach to assessing 
differential treatment in benefit schemes. In Auton
100
 McLachlin C.J.C. 
reiterated the four principles concerning comparator groups from Hodge 
as follows: 
1. The choice of the correct comparator is crucial. 
2. The Court must ensure that the comparator is appropriate. 
3. The comparator group should mirror the characteristic of the claimant 
except for the personal characteristic related to the enumerated or 
analogous ground raised as the basis for discrimination. 
4. A claimant relying on a personal characteristic related to disability 
may invite comparison with those suffering from a different type of 
disability or a disability of greater severity.
101
 
While recognizing the difficulties that accompany the comparator 
analysis, the Chief Justice and Abella J. provide no comments on how to 
move forward with respect to this issue. While this issue is difficult, the 
cases illustrate that it is also a fundamentally important consideration 
when assessing section 15(1) claims, especially those that involve large 
social benefit schemes. These schemes are designed to provide benefits 
to a large number of individuals and in most cases are structurally 
designed to draw distinctions in benefits among different groups. Thus, 
while the critiques of this analysis may be well founded, Kapp provides 
no suggestions on how the Court may in future unravel this difficult and 
thorny issue. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The relegation of ameliorative purpose to a single factor in the 
human dignity analysis, beginning with Law
102
 (and applied in 
                                                                                                             
98  Andrews, supra, note 13, at 146. 
99  Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
100  Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 
71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
101  Id., at paras. 51-54. 
102  Supra, note 3. 
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Lovelace)
103
 did not assist the substantive equality rights purpose behind 
section 15. It also created confusion and inconsistency in how to apply 
the elusive dignity analysis, particularly in the context of under-inclusive 
challenges by another disadvantaged group to ameliorative programs. In 
its move away from Law‟s focus on dignity, Kapp104 holds out the 
promise of clarifying this confusion and setting a new jumping-off point 
for equality rights — particularly in respect of equality challenges to 
ameliorative programs. 
Moreover, in its embrace of section 15(2) as an independent equality 
rights ground, Kapp re-embraces the original substantive equality 
purpose of sections 15(1) and 15(2), as understood by the framers of the 
Charter and the very early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. The 
struggle with the difficult interplay between the two subsections of 
section 15 was made apparent in the early jurisprudence of lower courts 
interpreting section 15(2) as an exception to the equality rights guarantee 
of section 15(1). The Ontario Court of Appeal‟s short-lived decision in 
Lovelace can be seen as a “high-water mark” for a strong and 
independent role for section 15(2) that is firmly rooted in the substantive 
equality rights analysis set out by the early Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions on section 15. 
For all of its promise, however, Kapp leaves several difficult 
challenges in the equality jurisprudence unanswered. Kapp was not, for 
example, a challenge to an ameliorative program based on a claim of 
under-inclusiveness. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether or not its 
articulation of an independent role for section 15(2) will apply in that 
critical and difficult context. As found by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Lovelace, there would be no substantive equality rationale for restricting 
the independent application of section 15(2) to challenges by advantaged 
groups to ameliorative programs. Governments require flexibility to 
choose particular disadvantaged groups to benefit — even if it means 
excluding other disadvantaged groups. 
Moreover, while the Court seems to accept the criticisms that the 
Law analysis had become formalistic and difficult to apply, Kapp does 
not explicitly overturn two of the major controversial developments from 
Law — the comparator group or correspondence analysis. In fact, none 
of the contextual factors underlying the Law dignity analysis are 
explicitly abandoned or overturned, leaving open the question of what 
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role they may have in future cases. This may include the “ameliorative 
program” contextual factor, which on its face may appear redundant, yet 
could conceivably uphold, in part, a future ameliorative program that 
does not strictly meet the requirements of section 15(2). 
Equally up for future consideration is how the “rational connection” 
test articulated by the Court will be interpreted. As stated, the test is 
fairly deferential and a reasonable check on the government by allowing 
judicial review of programs that only “nominally” seek to serve 
ameliorative objectives but in practice serve other non-remedial 
objectives. While it does not appear to have been the intent of the Court, 
the quote and reliance upon the onerous test set out by the Manitoba 
Court of Queen‟s Bench in Manitoba Rice Farmers105 that further 
requires a nexus between the object of the program and the “cause of the 
disadvantage” may open the door to a more interventionist and onerous 
test being imposed in consideration of future ameliorative programs. 
Certainly, the rational connection test leaves a door wide open to 
significant judicial review of programs that include some non-remedial 
objectives. 
It remains to be seen how the Court will wrestle with these difficult 
issues in future cases, particularly in the challenging context of under-
inclusive claims by disadvantaged groups. 
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